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ABSTRACT 
 
 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AND FIRM 
PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 100 KOREAN COMPANIES 
 
 
By 
 
 
Yunjin Lee 
 
 
 
Executive compensation is a scheme used to mitigate agency problems, which arise 
when the interests of the owners are not aligned with those of the managers.  As one 
measure of corporate governance, I studied relationship between executive cash 
compensation and firm performance of 100 large Korean companies included in the 
KOSPI 100 for 2002 and 2001.  Pay-performance directional link, sensitivity, 
elasticity, semi-elasticity, and Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) were 
investigated using simple and multiple regressions.   
 
The findings indicate that there is a strong link between executive pay and firm 
performance represented as total return to shareholders, especially for directional link 
at an individual company level.  For pay-performance sensitivity and elasticity, the 
relationship was tighter for lagged indicators rather than for contemporaneous 
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indicators, which remains a puzzle.  However, pay-performance semi-elasticity with 
an accounting measure of return, ROA, was weak. Industry-wide returns had little 
influence on the executive pay levels.      
 
The puzzle recognized above could be attributed to lack of transparency in disclosing 
data on executive compensation and to absence of compensation committees in most 
Korean companies.  Improvement in availability of information and in active roles of 
compensation committees, as recommended by international codes of best practices, is 
warranted. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Separation of ownership and management can create agency problems to the owners 
when the managers act in their own self-interests (Fama 1980, Jensen & Meckling 
1976).  Executive compensation is a scheme used to mitigate these problems.  For 
large Korean companies, especially for chaebols and chaebol-affiliated companies 
where foundation families wield greater managerial power with little share ownership, 
their corporate governance is known to be weak.  Because those companies are not 
independently run but operated to maximize the interest of the overall group or the 
controlling family’s interest (Kato, Kim and Lee, 2003).  Executive compensation in 
these large corporations, as an evidence of poor corporate governance structure, 
appears to be set according to performance of the overall group and not according to 
that of individual affiliates, therefore accelerating agency costs. This important issue, 
relationship between executive pay and firm performance in big Korean companies, 
has so far been understudied. 
 
Although some argue that non-cash based compensation, such as equity-based awards, 
are used to provide significant incentives to managers (Stacey R. Kole 1997), 
especially in the US, executive compensation is largely confined to cash (salary, 
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bonus, and small amounts of other cash compensation) in Korea.  In addition, the 
proportion of cash among total rewards is more significant for bigger companies, 
which are subjects of this dissertation.  Here I examine the relationship between 
resident directors’ cash compensation and firm performance of the KOSPI 100 
companies, particularly measured by total return to shareholders and ROA. 
 
In the following section I describe data used in the analysis and their sources.  Section 
3 explains methodologies adopted to examine pay-performance relationship.  Section 
4 shows descriptive statistics of the company data analyzed.  The results of the 
analysis on pay-performance directional relationship, sensitivity and elasticity are 
followed in section 5.  Section 6 discusses compensation committee in large Korean 
companies and code of best practices for setting executive remuneration, followed by 
conclusion of this dissertation.   
 
 
II.  DATA 
 
Cash compensation data of listed companies are available in annual reports and proxy 
statements, which can be easily accessed in Korean from the KSE and the Financial 
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Supervisory Service (FSS) homepages1.  The data of total shareholder return for 
individual companies were provided by the Korea Securities Research Institute 
(KSRI).  As for industry returns, corporations included in the study were classified 
into six sectors: manufacturing, financial services, construction, gas and electricity, 
telecommunications, and other services, following statistical standards of industrial 
classification by the National Statistics Office (NSO).  The ROA information were 
retrieved from the Korea Information Service (KIS) website2. 
 
Data of one hundred companies comprising the KOSPI (Korea Composite Stock Price 
Index) 100 were used.  The Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) periodically revises the list 
of companies included in the index, which are the ones with the biggest market 
capitalization among the KOSPI 200 corporations.  I opted to make use of the 
companies included in the KOSPI 100, when the KSE announced a new list at its 
regular committee meeting on 14 June 2002.  Table 1 shows the list of 100 companies. 
 
                                                 
1 The URL for KSE is http://kind.kse.or.kr and the URL for FSS is http://dart.fss.or.kr. 
2 The URL for KIS is http://www.kisinfo.com/sangjang/intro.htm. 
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Only data for the fiscal years ended in 2001 and in 2002 instead of a long time series 
data were analyzed for two reasons3.  First, the annual reports prior to 2001 included 
many non-registered directors when disclosing the aggregate cash compensation level.  
Therefore executive pay was discounted4.  Second, cash compensation information 
was not separately available for resident executives, non-resident executives, and 
outside directors5.   
 
There were some companies that became wholly different entities during the time 
period analyzed or changed their reporting formats.  In such cases, either companies 
were excluded from the study or reasonable assumptions were made.   
 
Three companies were excluded from the entire analyses.  Kookmin Bank (60000), 
Good Morning Shinhan Secrities (8670), and Hana Bank (7360) underwent M&A, 
                                                 
3 Most Korean companies’ fiscal year ends in December.  However, there are some 
exceptions.  Daishin Securities (3540), Good Morning Shinhan Securities(8670), 
Samsung Securities (16360), Bukwang Pahrmaceuticals (3000), Hyundai Securities 
(3450), Hyundai Engineering & Construction (720), SK Securities (1510), and LG 
Investment & Securities (5940) have their financial year ended in March.  Samyang 
Corporation (70) closes its book in June.      
4 There are, however, still some companies that do not separately report y of 
resident directors and non-resident directors.  Examples are Daesang Corporation 
(1680), SK Chemicals (6120), Halla Climate Control (18880), and Keumkang Korea 
Chemicals (2380), etc. 
5 As for Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (10620), SK Chemicals (6120), and INI Steel (4020, 
for 2001 only), however, pay for resident executives, non-resident executives, and 
outside directors were aggregated.   
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and could not compute firm-level performance.  As for total shareholder return, 2001 
data for LG Electronics (66570) and LG Card (32710) were unavailable, since they 
IPOed in the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) in 2002.  2002 figures for Hynix 
Semiconductors (660), LGEI (2610), LG Electronics (66570), and 2001 data for 
Hyundai Engineering & Construction (720) were excluded, since they showed 
inconsistencies in value due to stock conversion, stock split, or share consolidation 
during the pertinent year.  LG Electronics (66570) was not included in the 
computation of ROA for 2002, since the company’s balance sheet for the year ended 
2001 was not reported.  Another three LG subsidiaries, LG Chemicals (51910), LG 
Card (32710) and LG Household & Health Care (51900), were excluded from 2001’s 
ROA computation, since those companies were listed in 2001 and therefore their 
balance sheets for 2000 were not publicly available.  
 
One company, Nongshim (4370), changed its fiscal year during 2001 from June to 
December.  Since Nongshim’s executive compensation level in the first half of 2001 
was not disclosed, I assumed that the missing part could be estimated by 
approximating the same pay level as in the second half of 2001.   
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For several companies, inconsistencies in reporting formats were observed.  LG Card 
(32710) and INI Steel (4020) separated the number and pay of resident directors and 
outside directors in 2002, whereas they aggregated the equivalent data for 2001.  LG 
Industrial Systems (10120) reported the cash payment to outside directors in 2001, but 
dropped the pertinent information in 2002. 
III.  METHODOLOGY 
 
A. Computation of Average Cash Compensation 
Average cash compensation was basically computed by dividing aggregate pay by the 
number of registered directors, because information on individual director’s 
compensation was not separately disclosed.  This, however, was complicated by a 
number of factors.  First, there were outside directors, whose pay is considerably 
lower than executive directors.  This means that the level of average pay can be 
influenced by the ratio of outside directors.  To resolve this problem, I only 
concentrated on the pay to executive directors6.  Second, non-executive directors also 
receive pay lower than resident executives.  So I excluded non-resident executive 
                                                 
6 However, there are three exceptions as noted above in footnote 5.  Pay for resident 
executives, non-resident executives, and outside directors were not separately 
available for Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (10620), SK Chemicals (6120), and INI Steel 
(4020, in 2001 only). 
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directors from the calculation of average pay7.  Third, pay for auditors were excluded 
from the computation for two reasons.  The composition of auditors depended on 
individual corporations and was highly arbitrary in including resident executives, non-
resident executives, and/or outside directors.  The compensation level for auditors was 
also complicated, falling in between that of resident executives and that of outside 
directors, in many cases the middle value8.  Fourth, if a director resigns before the 
Annual General Meeting (AGM) and does not serve full year, the level of aggregate 
cash compensation would fall and make the average pay lower.  To resolve this 
problem, I divided by the hypothetical number of directors that incorporates the 
number of months he/she served during the fiscal year9. 
 
B. Pay-Performance Analysis 
The agency theory dictates that compensation plans are designed to align the interests 
of risk-averse self-interested executives with those of shareholders (Murphy 1999).  
                                                 
7 As for companies which did not disclose cash compensation information separately 
for resident and non-resident executives, I assumed that non-residents receive the 
same level of pay as residents. 
8 There were exceptions due to availability of information.  Hyundai Heavy Industries 
(9540), Hyundai Mipo Dockyard (10620), Kia Motors (270), LG Electronics (66570), 
LG Cable (6260), KT(30200), Dongkuk Steel Mill (1230), Keumkang Korea 
Chemicals (2380), Honam Petrochem. (11170), Cheil Ind. (1300), and Samyang (70, 
2001 only) disclosed the pay level of auditors in aggregation with that of resident 
executives. 
9 Suppose there were 5 executive directors at fiscal year-end, they received 450 
million won as cash compensation.  If one director resigned as of June 30, the average 
pay would be 100 million won (=450/4.5). 
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Pay-performance analysis empirically examines how closely the interests of two 
parties are tied.  Wealth of resident directors, which is explicitly tied to the principal’s 
objective through his holdings of stock, restricted stocks, and stock options (Murphy 
1998), is beyond the scope of this dissertation, because the level of compensation 
other than cash is relatively insignificant in Korean cases.   
 
In this dissertation I investigate implicit relationship between resident directors’ cash 
compensation and firm performance measures, following computation specifications 
described in Murphy (1999).  Among many different measures of firm performance, 
total return to shareholder as a stock performance indicator and ROA as an operating 
performance indicator were used. 
 
Pay-Performance Directional Link 
A directional link between the absolute amount of change in shareholder value and 
that in executive cash compensation is measured as in the following formula (1).  For 
instance, if both shareholder value and cash compensation increase or decrease at the 
same time, the value will be positive.  In contrast, if executive compensation increases 
when shareholder value decreases, or vice versa, the division result will have a 
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negative value.  Positive and higher values suggest that directors’ pay is better aligned 
with performance of a firm. 
 
For individual companies, the change in total cash compensation and the change in 
average cash compensation each are divided by the contemporaneous and lagged 
changes in shareholder value.  
 
∆(Cash Compensation)it / ∆(Shareholder Value)it                                     … (1) 
 
Using logarithms to measure changes in pay and in shareholder value, I studied pay-
performance relationship in percentage changes at an individual company level.  As in 
the first formula, total and average cash compensation data, and contemporaneous and 
lagged indicators of shareholder value were used. 
 
∆ln(Cash Compensation)it / ∆ln(Shareholder Value)it                                … (2) 
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Pay-Performance Sensitivity for Cash Compensation 
To examine pay-performance sensitivity of all the companies in the analysis, I follow 
the regression specifications by Jensen and Murphy (1990).  The formula (3) shows 
the contribution of the change in cash compensation to the change in shareholder 
value.  The coefficient b represents how significant the contribution is.   
 
∆(Cash Compensation)it = a + b∆(Shareholder Value)it                               … (3) 
 
Pay-Performance Elasticity for Cash Compensation 
The fourth formula, as in the following, using a logarithm, was taken to measure pay-
performance elasticity for all the companies in the study.  The relative value of the 
percentage change in cash compensation to that in shareholder value is measured.  To 
compute elasticity I follow the regression specifications of Coughlan and Schmidt 
(1985) and Murphy (1986): 
 
∆ln(Cash Compensation)it = α + β∆ln(Shareholder Value)it                           
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The above is equivalent to the following formula: ∆ln(Cash Compensation)it = α + β 
ln(1 + Return to Shareholders)it10                                                      …(4) 
 
Neither the sensitivity nor the elasticity approach strictly dominates the other (Murph 
1999).  The primary advantage of the elasticity approach is that it produces a “better-
fit” in the sense that rates of return explain more of cross-sectional variation of 
∆ln(CEO Pay) than changes in shareholder value explain of ∆(CEO Pay).  In addition, 
while pay-performance sensitivities vary monotonically with firm size, the elasticity is 
relatively invariant to firm size (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). 
 
                                                 
10 ∆ln(Shareholder Value)it  
= ln(Shareholder Value)it - ln(Shareholder Value)it-1 
= ln[
1-it
it
Value)er (Sharehold
Value)er (Sharehold ] 
= ln[1 +
1-it
1-itit
Value)er (Sharehold
Value)er (Sharehold - Value)er (Sharehold ] 
= ln(1 + Return to Shareholders)it 
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Pay-Performance Semi-Elasticity for Cash Compensation 
Using a different parameter of firm performance, I studied pay-performance semi-
elasticity following the methodology by Kaplan (1994).  The regression assesses 
relationship between the log of the change in executive compensation and the change 
in ROA as in the following formula: 
 
∆ln(Cash Compensation)it = α + β∆(ROA)it                                          …(5) 
 
Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) 
The agency theory concerns the use of relative performance evaluation in empirically 
measuring pay-performance relationship (Holmstrom, 1982).  If the component of 
company performance contains an industry or market effect as well as an idiosyncratic 
effect, then the influence should be taken out of the performance measures.  I 
replicated Gibbons and Murphy (1990) methodology for relative performance 
evaluation.  Here I only considered industry return data because market return is a 
constant, showing the same value over all the cross-sectional data examined. 
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∆ln(Cash Compensation)it = α + βln(1 + Return to Shareholders)it + γln(1 + Industry 
Return)it                                                                            …(6) 
 
 
IV.  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF THE COMPANIES ANALYZED 
 
Table 2 presents descriptive features of the companies included in the analysis.  The 
average number of resident directors decreased from 5.78 in 2001 to 5.58 in 2002, 
whereas the average number of outside directors slightly increased from 3.86 in 2001 
to 3.88 in 2002.  Most companies had less than 10 resident directors.  Most noticeable 
exceptions with higher values were due to the companies that aggregated the number 
of resident and non-resident directors.  Daesang Corporation (1680) disclosed 29 
directors for 2002 and 30 directors for 2001.  SK Chemicals (6120) reported 21 
directors (also including outside directors) in 2002, a significant increase from 8 in 
2001.  The number of resident directors sharply fell in some companies, such as 
Hankuk Electronic Glass (9720) (from 13 in 2001 to 2 in 2002), which was ascribed 
to the regulatory effect. 
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Pay level in general rose in 2002 compared with that in 2001.  Especially the average 
level of resident directors’ cash compensation increased significantly, whereas that of 
outside directors’ cash compensation showed a rather modest growth.  Values were 
widely spread over with high standard deviations.  The maximum value of average 
pay of resident directors was for Samsung Electronics (5930) for both years.  The 
minimum values were for SK Chemicals (6120) in 2002 and for Hyundai Heavy 
Industries (9540) in 2001, which were in fact diluted due to the aggregation of pay for 
resident, non-resident, and outside directors.  Top 10 companies ranked for total and 
average pay of resident directors in both years are listed below.  
 
Rank Company Name Total Pay 
in 2002
Rank Company Name Total Pay in 
2001
1 Samsung 
Electronics 
36,500,00
0
1 Samsung 
Electronics 
24,250,000
2 Samsung 7,469,000 2 Samsung  5,150,000
3 CJ 5,599,327 3 Good Morning 
Shinhan 
Securities 
4,594,000
4 Samsung SDI 4,744,000 4 Samsung SDI 3,730,000
5 Samsung Fire & 
Marine Insurance 
4,703,540 5 Samsung Fire & 
Marine Insurance 
3,727,561
6 Orion Corp. 4,366,000 6 CJ 3,365,573
7 Good Morning 
Shinhan Securities 
4,088,000 7 Daesang 2,764,730
8 Hyosung 3,866,875 8 Cheil 
Communications 
2,544,000
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9 Cheil 
Communications 
3,544,000 9 Cheil Ind. 2,507,232
10 SK Telecom 3,525,000 10 LG Electronics 2,416,000
(in thousands Korean won) 
 
 
Rank Company Name Average 
Pay in 
2002
Rank Company Name Average 
Pay in 2001
1 Samsung 
Electronics 
5,214,286 1 Samsung 
Electronics 
3,464,286
2 Samsung SDI 1,581,333 2 Samsung SDI 1,243,333
3 CJ 1,389,832 3 Samsung Fire & 
Marine Insurance 
931,890
4 Samsung  1,244,833 4 Samsung  858,333
5 Samsung Fire & 
Marine Insurance 
1,175,885 5 CJ 841,393
6 LG Card 1,094,000 6 Samsung Techwin 779,867
7 Samsung Heavy 
Ind. 
962,000 7 Samsung 
Securities 
766,667
8 LGEI 881,000 8 Samsung Heavy 
Ind. 
660,117
9 Samsung Techwin 860,133 9 Samsung Electro-
Mechanics 
638,667
10 Samsung Securities 847,667 10 LG Electronics 604,000
(in thousands Korean won) 
 
Figure 1 and 2 show total pay of directors in thousands Korean won in 2002 and in 
2001 respectively for individual companies.  Figure 3 and 4 are histograms for 
average of executive pay levels in 2002 and in 2001 respectively.  Clearly both total 
and average compensation rose in 2002 than that in 2001.  With exceptions of few 
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outliers, data of cash compensation were concentrated on the first quartile of the entire 
values.  Figures from 5 to 8 each are the equivalent of the figures from 1 to 4, using a 
logarithm for pay amounts. 
 
Average of total return to shareholders in 2001 was higher at 58.16% than 19.13% in 
2002.  The minimum values were taken by Daewoo Securities (6800) in 2002 and by 
LGCI (3550) in 2001.  In contrast, ROA was higher in 2002 with a mean of 3.09% 
than in 2001 of 1.93%.  Data of both performance measures were spread over a large 
range with high standard deviations.  
 
 
V.  RESULTS OF ANALYSIS  
 
A. Pay-Performance Directional Link 
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the formula (1) for individual companies.  
In most corporations, the change in executive cash compensation had a positive 
relationship with the change in shareholder value.  Figure 9 and 10 are scatter plots 
between the change in total cash compensation and that in shareholder value in 2002 
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and in 2001 respectively.  Both figures show that values mostly lie above the origin.  
Out of 90 companies analyzed, 23 and 22 corporations had negative values in the year 
2002 and 2001 respectively, suggesting a poor alignment of executive compensation 
with shareholder value.  The average of the coefficient for the change in total cash 
compensation showed a sharp increase to 0.0007246 in 2002 from 0.0004987 in 2001.  
Both statistics had high t-values, suggesting a concentration around the mean.  
 
For the change in average cash compensation, the mean value slightly decreased to 
0.0001224 in 2002 from 0.0001254 in 2001.  Again most companies had positive 
values but with exceptions of 13 and 12 corporations in the year 2002 and 2001 
respectively.  Figure 11 and 12 are scatter plots between the change in average cash 
compensation and that in shareholder value in 2002 and in 2001 respectively,  
showing that most values are positive.  However, the statistical value for 2002 was 
less significant around the mean within a 5% confidence level. 
 
Table 4 shows summary statistics for pay-performance directional link for individual 
companies, following the formula (2), which uses a logarithm.  The results were 
consistent with those of the formula (1).  Most companies had positive values with 
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some exceptions both for total and average compensation in 2002 as well as in 2001.  
All numbers were statistically significant with high t values.  This means that the 
directional change in cash compensation for individual companies is very much 
aligned with the directional change in firm performance. 
 
B. Pay-Performance Sensitivity 
Table 5 presents the regression results for pay-performance sensitivity of the formula 
(3).  In both years for 2002 and 2001, and for the change in total cash compensation 
and in average total compensation, all four coefficients were significantly different 
from zero and their t values were very high within a 1% confidence level.  This means 
that as for the KOSPI 100 companies executive compensation was highly correlated 
with firm performance.  Despite significant sensitivity shown, it is puzzling that the 
coefficient values were higher with lagged indicators rather than with 
contemporaneous ones.   
 
C. Pay-Performance Elasticity 
The regression results of the formula (4) were shown in Table 6.  Coefficients of the 
contemporaneous indicators of firm performance did not have statistical significance.  
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However, the coefficient of the lagged performance indicators had high positive 
values (significantly different from zero) within a 5% confidence level.  It remains a 
puzzle that pay-performance elasticity for the previous year is very strong, whereas 
that for the current year is weak.  
 
D. Pay-Performance Semi-Elasticity 
Regression coefficients with ROA as an independent variable had little statistical 
significance for 2002 as well as for 2001, showing that the accounting measure of 
firm performance does not play an important role in setting executive compensation.  
This result is consistent with another recent study on executive compensation in Korea 
(Kato, Kim and Lee, 2003). 
 
E. Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) 
The multiple regression results of the formula (6) are tabulated in Table 7.  
Coefficients for industry returns had very little statistical significance and therefore 
could be ignored, meaning that executive compensation was barely influenced by 
industry-wide performance.  The independent variable does not explain variations in 
the change in cash compensation of directors.   
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As for the values of coefficients for total shareholder return, again lagged indicators 
had high positive values whereas contemporaneous indicators were poor in explaining 
relative performance.  This observation is consistent with the previous ones for pay-
performance sensitivity and elasticity.   
 
 
 
 
VI.  COMPENSATION COMMITTEE 
 
The puzzle shown in the study results above, absence of link between executive 
compensation and contemporaneous firm performance indicators, could be attributed 
to lack of transparency in setting directors’ pay.  Information on executive 
compensation of listed companies are incomplete and not transparent enough in Korea.  
In the annual reports, most companies report their base salary and incentive bonus for 
directors in aggregation only but not separately.  In addition, there is no specific 
requirement to disclose the amount of pay for individual directors.  The procedures 
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and policies to set executive pay are also not disclosed.  The lack of information 
prevents shareholders from judging the appropriate level of executive pay (Kim, 
2003), therefore leading to a loose link between pay and performance.  
 
Only ten companies out of the total 100 companies included in the analysis officially 
had compensation committees in the board.  Most of them belong to financial services 
industries.  The following are the list of companies with compensation committees: 
Good Morning Shinhan Securities (8670), Daewoo Securities (6800), Chohung Bank 
(10), Hana Bank (7360), Koram Bank (16830), KT&G (33780), KT (30200), S-Oil 
(10950), Mirae Corporation (25560) and POSCO (5490). 
 
The Korean situation leaves much room for improvement in corporate governance.  In 
the appendix A and B, I attached recommended best practices of compensation 
committees by the International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) and by 
Hermes Investment International respectively.   
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
 
Executive compensation is a tool used to mitigate agency costs, which arise when the 
interests of owners are not aligned with those of managers.  As a measure of corporate 
governance in large Korean companies, I studied relationship between executive 
compensation and firm performance in this dissertation.  Pay-performance directional 
relationship, sensitivity, elasticity, semi-elasticity, and RPE were analyzed.  
 
Most among the KOSPI 100 companies investigated showed strong pay-performance 
directional link, suggesting that increases in shareholder values were accompanied by 
increases in cash compensation.  High values of pay-performance relationship suggest 
that in large Korean companies executive pay is strongly linked with shareholder 
return, whereas weak semi-elasticity shows that the cash compensation does fluctuate 
little depending on accounting indicators.  This conclusion is consistent with existing 
studies.  However, there still remains a puzzle that lagged performance indicators had 
tighter link than contemporaneous indicators.  Executive pay was barely influenced by 
industry-wide ups-and-downs but by returns to shareholders.   
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The somewhat puzzling relationship between pay and performance in large Korean 
companies could be ascribed to lack of information and transparency on executive 
compensation and dysfunctioning of compensation committees.  Only nine companies 
out of the one hundred companies included in the analysis had compensation 
committees, none of which reported the procedures and policies of setting executive 
compensation.  The current Korean situation warrants improvement in transparency of 
information and more active roles of compensation committees when setting the level 
of executive compensation.    
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Table 1. 
List of Companies 
KSE Code Company Name 
01830 ANAM SEMICONDUCTORS 
03000 BUKWANG PHARM. 
30000 CHEIL COMMUNICATIONS 
01300 CHEIL IND. 
00010 CHOHUNG BANK 
01040 CJ 
15940 DACOM 
08060 DAEDUCK ELECTRONICS 
00210 DAELIM IND. 
01680 DAESANG 
40740 DAEWOO CONSTRUCTIONS 
42670 DAEWOO HEAVY INDUSTRIES & MACHINERY 
06800 DAEWOO SECURITIES 
42660 DAEWOO SHIPBUILDING&MARINE ENGINEERING 
03540 DAISHIN SECURITIES 
10060 DC CHEM. 
00640 DONGA PHARM. 
01230 DONHKUK STILL MILL 
00150 DOOSAN 
34020 DOOSAN HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
08670 GOOD MORNING SHINHAN SECURITIES 
18880 HALLA CLIMATE CONTROL 
07360 HANA BANK 
03300 HANILCEMENT CO.,LTD. 
03480 HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
00700 HANJIN SHIPPING 
00240 HANKOOK TIRE 
09720 HANKUK ELECTRIC GLASS 
02000 HANKUK GLASS 
04150 HANSOL PAPER 
00880 HANWHA 
09830 HANWHA CHEM. 
00140 HITE BREW 
11170 HONAM PETROCHEM. 
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00660 HYNIX SEMICONDUCTORS 
04800 HYOSUNG 
05440 HYUNDAI DEPARTMENT STORE H&C 
12630 HYUNDAI DEVELOPMENT ENGINEERING&CONSTRCTIONS 
00720 HYUNDAI ENG & CONST 
09540 HYUNDAI HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
10520 HYUNDAI HYSCO 
10620 HYUNDAI MIPO DOCKYARD 
12330 HYUNDAI MOBIS 
05380 HYUNDAI MOTORS 
03450 HYUNDAI SECURITIES 
04020 INI STEEL 
33240 JAWHA ELECTRONICS 
02380 KEUMKANG KOREA CHEM. 
00270 KIA MOTORS 
60000 KOOKMIN BANK 
16830 KORAM BANK 
03490 KOREA AIRLINES 
15760 KOREA ELECTRIC POWER 
04940 KOREA EXCHANGE BANK 
36460 KOREA GAS CORPORATION 
10130 KOREA ZINC 
30200 KT 
33780 KT&G 
06260 LG CABLE  
32710 LG CARD 
51910 LG CHEM. 
66570 LG ELECTRONICS 
06360 LG ENGINEERING & CONSTRUCTION 
51900 LG HOUSEHOLD&HEALTH CARE 
10120 LG INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS 
05940 LG INVESTMENT&SECURITIES 
03550 LGCI 
02610 LGEI 
25560 MIRAE CORP. 
25860 NAMHAE CHEM. 
04370 NONGSHIM 
01800 ORION Corp. 
02790 PACIFIC CORP. 
25930 PANTECH 
05810 POONGSAN 
05490 POSCO 
12750 S1 CORP. 
05500 SAMJIN PHARM. 
00830 SAMSUNG 
09150 SAMSUNG ELECTRO-MECHANICS 
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05930 SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 
04000 SAMSUNG FINE CHEM. 
00810 SAMSUNG FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE 
10140 SAMSUNG HEAVY INDUSTRIES 
06400 SAMSUNG SDI 
16360 SAMSUNG SECURITIES 
12450 SAMSUNG TECHWIN 
00070 SAMYANG 
55550 SHINHAN FINANCIAL GROUP 
04170 SHINSEGAE 
29530 SINDO RICOH 
03600 SK 
06120 SK CHEMICALS 
01740 SK GLOBAL 
01510 SK SECURITIES 
17670 SK TELECOM 
10950 S-Oil 
01440 TAIHAN ELECTRONIC WIRE 
14900 TRIGEM COMPUTER 
00100 YUHAN 
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Table 2. 
Summary Statistics 
 Mean Median Min Max S.d Observations 
Number of resident directors in 2002 5.58 4 2 29 4.21 97 
Total pay of resident directors in 2002 (KRW mil.) 1,996.65 1,260.86 271.32 36,500.00 3,776.16 97 
Average pay of resident directors in 2002 (KRW mil.) 410.50 244.84 61.43 5,214.29 584.06 97 
Number of resident directors in 2001 5.78 5 1 30 3.80 97 
Total pay of resident directors in 2001 (KRW mil.) 1,525.38 1,062.63 245.00 24,250.00 2,505.37 97 
Average pay of resident directors in 2001 (KRW mil.) 298.54 179.00 58.27 3,464.29 391.80 97 
       
Number of outside directors in 2002 3.88 3.25 1 9 2.00 95 
Total pay of outside directors in 2002 (KRW mil.) 140.40 108.00 8.00 1,878.00 200.56 92 
Average pay of outside directors in 2002 (KRW mil.) 34.09 30.00 4.00 326.61 32.85 92 
Number of outside directors in 2001 3.86 3.75 1 9 1.88 93 
Total pay of outside directors in 2001 (KRW mil.) 115.41 98.50 18.00 465.00 78.28 90 
Average pay of outside directors in 2001 (KRW mil.) 29.47 26.84 6.00 87.24 12.99 90 
       
Total return to shareholders in 2002 (%) 19.13 17.80 -69.73 131.53 36.96 93 
Total return to shareholders in 2001 (%) 58.16 59.61 -49.40 180.95 43.09 94 
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ROA in 2002 (%) 3.09 4.00 -44.17 22.62 8.51 96 
ROA in 2001 (%) 1.93 2.74 -33.93 22.80 7.74 93 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. 
Pay-Performance Directional Link for Individual Companies (1) 
 Mean  Median Min Max S.d Observations 
∆(Total Cash Compensation) /  
∆(Shareholder Value)2002 
0.0007246 
(3.6290)*** 
0.0002568 -0.0026474 0.0110671 0.0019461 95 
∆(Average Cash Compensation) /  
∆(Shareholder Value)2002 
0.0001224 
(2.1787)** 
0.000052 -0.0008077 0.001581 0.0003134 95 
∆(Total Cash Compensation) /  0.0004987 0.0002765 -0.0110397 0.0139483 0.0021716 90 
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∆(Shareholder Value)2001 (3.8050)*** 
∆(Average Cash Compensation) /  
∆(Shareholder Value)2001 
0.0001254 
(3.7275)*** 
0.0000565 -0.0004957 0.0023247 0.0003192 90 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. 
***: significant at 1% level, **: significant at 5% level 
The change in cash compensation was computed by subtracting the amount paid in 2001 from the amount paid in 2002.  The change in 
shareholder value was calculated for the pertinent year when the compensation was paid as well as for the preceding year of the payment 
made.  The contemporaneous value, ∆(Shareholder Value)2002 was calculated by multiplying total shareholder return in 2002 by end 
2001 market capitalization.  The lagged value, ∆(Shareholder Value)2001 was calculated by multiplying total shareholder return in 2001 
by end 2000 market capitalization.  
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Table 4. 
Pay-Performance Directional Link for Individual Companies (2) 
 Mean  Median Min Max S.d Observations 
∆ln(Total Cash Compensation) /  
∆ln(Shareholder Value)2002 
0.0073645 
(4.8425)*** 
0.0064922 -0.326058 0.666695 0.146662 93 
∆ln(Average Cash Compensation) /  
∆ln(Shareholder Value)2002 
0.0091492 
(6.2706)*** 
0.0068782 -0.0289609 0.621024 0.014078 93 
∆ln(Total Cash Compensation) /  
∆ln(Shareholder Value)2001 
0.007044 
(4.5131)*** 
0.0064566 -0.0332284 0.0617987 0.0147236 90 
∆ln(Average Cash Compensation) /  
∆ln(Shareholder Value)2001 
0.0089887 
(6.0006)*** 
0.0071786 -0.288672 0.061516 0.0142109 90 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. 
***: significant at 1% level 
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Table 5.  
Pay-Performance Sensitivity – Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent 
Variable 
∆(Total Cash Compensation) ∆(Avg Cash Compensation) 
A. Change in Shareholder Wealth in 2002 
   Intercept 63.22458 
(0.64) 
46.33043 
(2.76) 
∆(Shareholder 
Wealth)2002 
0.0001687 
(11.24)*** 
0.0000239 
(9.38)*** 
   Adjusted R2 0.5716 0.4807 
   Sample Size 95 95 
B. Change in Shareholder Wealth in 2001 
   Intercept 100.0446 
(0.88) 
529.4132 
(2.81) 
 ∆(Shareholder 
Wealth)2001 
0.0001765 
(9.33)*** 
0.0002485 
(7.95)*** 
   Adjusted R2 0.4913 0.4113 
   Sample Size 90 90 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. 
***: significant at 1% level 
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Table 6. 
Pay-Performance Elasticity and Semi-Elasticity – Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent 
Variable 
∆ln(Total Cash 
Compensation) 
∆ln(Avg Cash Compensation)
A. Change in Shareholder Value in 2002 
   Intercept 0.3113107 
(0.37) 
-0.9689283 
(-1.22) 
∆ln(Shareholder 
Value)2002 
-0.0040386 
(-0.13) 
0.0446358 
(1.54) 
   Adjusted R2 -0.0108 0.0146 
   Sample Size 93 93 
B. Change in Shareholder Value in 2001 
   Intercept -1.676106 
(-1.84)* 
-1.523532 
(-1.74)* 
 ∆ln(Shareholder 
Value)2001 
0.685553 
(2.06)** 
0.649407 
(2.02)** 
   Adjusted R2 0.0350 0.0337 
   Sample Size 90 90 
 
C. ROA in 2002   
   Intercept 0.1965365 
(4.62) 
0.253876 
(6.21) 
   ∆(ROA 02) 0.0018928 
(0.30) 
-0.000014 
(-0.00) 
   Adjusted R2 -0.0100 -0.0110 
   Sample Size 93 93 
D. ROA in 2001   
   Intercept 0.1963008 
(4.46) 
0.2484929 
(5.88) 
   ∆(ROA 01) 0.0003949 0.001114 
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(0.06) (0.18) 
   Adjusted R2 -0.0115 -0.0111 
   Sample Size 89 89 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses.   
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Table 7. 
Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) - Multiple Regression Results 
 Dependent Variable: 
Independent 
Variable 
∆ln(Total Cash 
Compensation) 
∆ln(Avg Cash Compensation)
A. 2002   
   Intercept 0.230236 
(5.07) 
0.2607526 
(5.92)*** 
Ln(1+Sh Ret 
02) 
-0.1439176 
(-1.23) 
-0.0965736 
(-0.85) 
   Ln(1+Ind Ret 02) 0.16891348 
(0.89) 
-0.0525344 
(-0.29) 
Adjusted R2 0.0052 -0.0135 
Sample Size 93 93 
B. 2001   
   Intercept 0.0187251 
(0.14) 
0.0181168 
(0.13) 
Ln(1+Sh Ret 
01) 
0.4185521 
(3.11)*** 
0.4199023 
(3.12)*** 
   Ln(1+Ind Ret 01) 0.0266228 
(0.14) 
0.0253194 
(0.07) 
Adjusted R2 0.0828 0.0833 
Sample Size 94 94 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses. 
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Figure 1.  Total Executive Cash Compensation in 2002          Figure 2.  Total Executive Cash Compensation in 2001 
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Figure 3.  Average Executive Cash Compensation in 2002      Figure 4.  Average Executive Cash Compensation in 2001 
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Figure 5.  Logarithm of Total Cash Compensation in 2002        Figure 6.  Logarithm of Total Cash Compensation in 2001 
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Figure 7.  Logarithm of Average Cash Compensation in 2002      Figure 8.  Logarithm of Average Cash Compensation in 2001        
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Figure 9.  Scatter Plot - Change in Total Cash Compensation     Figure 10.  Scatter Plot - Change in Total Cash Compensation                         
and Change in Shareholder Value in 2002                                               and Change in Shareholder Value in 2001 
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Figure 11.  Scatter Plot - Change in Average Cash Compensation    Figure 12.  Scatter Plot - Change in Average Cash Compensation                         
and Change in Shareholder Value in 2002                                              and Change in Shareholder Value in 2001 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Best Practices for Executive Director Remuneration 
The International Corporate Governance Network (ICGN) 
 
The ICGN’s recommended best practices include: 
 
1. Remuneration committees composed of truly independent directors should be 
responsible for designing and controlling executive remuneration schemes. 
 
2. Remuneration committees should publish statements on expected outcomes of 
remuneration structures and prepare remuneration reports that are approved by 
the board, included in annual reports provided to investors and, where legally 
allowed, approved by shareholders. 
 
3. Remuneration committees should hire and fire consultants retained to address 
executive and/or director remuneration. 
 
4. All aspects of remuneration of key executives and directors, including salary, 
short- and long-term bonuses, other incentives, benefits, perquisites and other 
cash/non-cash payments should be disclosed to investors. 
 
5. Substantial, direct stock ownership by key executives and directors is the best 
way to align management and investor interests. 
 
6. Remuneration should be linked to appropriate short- and long-term 
performance measures, and final payments under short- and long-term 
incentive arrangements should not be disproportionate to performance. 
 
7. Options should not be the sole long-term incentive.  Ideally options and other 
share-based payments should have vesting terms of at least three years and be 
granted at regular intervals.  Repricing of these instruments should not be 
made without shareholder approval. 
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8. Options and other share-based payments should be expensed on income 
statements provided to investors. 
 
9. Employment contracts should not be used as retention devices or provide 
coverage for terms in office longer than twelve months. 
 
10. Companies should not loan money to executives or pay bonuses based solely 
on the completion of mergers and acquisitions. 
 
11. Institutional investors should increase the resources devoted to analyzing 
remuneration issues and remuneration proposals. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
Hermes Investment Management Group 
Statement on UK Corporate Governance & Voting Policy – 2001 
 
 
REMUNERATION 
 
1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
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1.1. Performance-related remuneration is the principle means by which Eds are 
motivated to achieve greater shareholder value and are rewarded for doing so.  It 
is therefore an area of company policy in which shareholders have a valid role 
 
1.2. Remuneration committees of independent NEDs are best placed to decide the 
remuneration packages necessary to recruit, retain, and motivate executives.  
They should take professional advice as necessary.  Where independent advisers 
are appointed they should be responsible to the remuneration committee and not 
the company’s Eds.  Consideration should be given to naming the advisers in the 
board’s remuneration report.  Hermes encourages companies to put the board’s 
remuneration report to a vote at the AGM, particularly where significant changes 
are made to policy or controversial issues arise during the year. 
  
1.3. Remuneration is a package.  Actual and potential rewards should not be 
excessive; scrutiny from informed observers should not diminish the legitimacy 
of the executive team in the eyes of shareholders or employees.  Performance-
related remuneration should be aligned over time with returns earned by 
shareholders.  Increases in remuneration should be driven by improved 
performance and should not just be a matter of annual appreciation 
 
1.4. Companies should require all directors to build over a period of time a 
substantial shareholding, say to the value of at least one year’s emoluments.  For 
NEDs, one way of achieving this is to pay them partly in shares which must be 
retained whilst they hold office.  NEDs who are executives elsewhere, and 
whose fees are paid to their primary employer, should receive the share 
component of their fee.  NEDs should not participate in performance-related pay 
or incentive schemes. 
 
1.5. Hermes recognises the difficulty faced by companies with international 
operations when designing remuneration packages, particularly incentive 
schemes.  Although it is accepted that companies have to offer packages that are 
competitive in the local market there are certain features that should be universal. 
 
1.6. Hermes will assess all schemes individually, taking into account the particular 
circumstances of the company, but sound reasons would need to be given by a 
remuneration committee proposing a scheme that did not comply with the spirit 
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of the above principles. 
 
2. CONTRACTS 
 
2.1. Hermes prefers that executives be appointed on one-year rolling contracts.  
Executives appointed on a two-year fixed contract that subsequently reduces to a one-
year rolling contract will also be supported.  Hermes does not currently vote against 
existing directors with two-year rolling contracts but recommends that these be 
reduced to one year, without compensation, as a show of leadership.  Contracts with a 
clause that increases compensation paid for yearly termination in the event of a take-
over are not supported. 
 
3. INCENTIVE SCHEME PRINCIPLES 
 
3.1. Incentive schemes should be designed to reward exceptional performance.  
Awards should be scaled against achievement of performance criteria, with a 
relatively low payout if the minimum target is achieved and full payout only for truly 
exceptional performance.  No award should be made where targets are not met.  The 
measure used will vary depending on the type of incentive but performance should be 
compared to an appropriate benchmark or peer group.  Awards should not be made 
unless there has been improvement in the underlying real financial position of the 
company.  Where comparative performance against a peer group is used as the 
measure awards should generally not be made when company performance is below 
median.  Earnings per share growth of RPI+2% a year is not a suitably challenging 
performance target for the majority of companies. 
 
3.2. Performance measurement and vesting periods should ideally be five years 
although a minimum of three years will be considered.  A further holding period 
between vesting and sale is encouraged. 
 
3.3. Share matching schemes should be subject to challenging performance criteria 
and grants made should not be overly generous. 
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3.4. Remuneration committees should explain proposed schemes clearly to 
shareholders, justifying the structure of the scheme and the relevance of the 
performance criteria chosen.  Schemes should be structured as simply as possible to 
ensure they can be understood by participants and monitored by shareholders.  The 
link between company performance and executive reward should be clear.  The effect 
of the scheme should be illustrated with examples showing rewards at various 
performance levels for one of the participants, say, the chief executive. 
 
3.5. The dilution guidelines published by the Association of British Insurers should be 
observed. 
 
3.6. Where annual grants are made there should be no retesting periods; of the 
performance targets are not met the award for that year should be foregone. 
 
3.7. Where remuneration committee have authority to vary incentive schemes they 
should only do so in exceptional circumstances and to ensure that the scheme 
continues to motivate executives.  All changes should be reported and justified to 
shareholders. 
 
3.8. Companies should confirm continuing shareholder support for a scheme during 
its lifetime, giving shareholders an opportunity to reassess the scheme in light of 
actual payout levels. 
 
3.9. Companies should have only one executive long-term incentive scheme in place; 
exceptions should be justified in the remuneration report.  Executives should not be 
awarded twice for the same performance.  Remuneration committees should take into 
consideration the number of options outstanding and the remaining period for which 
they are exercisable when making grants under a newly introduced performance share 
scheme. 
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3.10. The annual report should disclose the level of recent grants made under any 
existing incentive scheme, the performance criteria applied to the grants, and any 
grants resulting from grants made in previous years.  The actual performance resulting 
in the vesting of grants should be disclosed and clearly explained. 
 
4. INCENTIVE SCHEME STRUCTURE 
 
4.1. Share option schemes 
Share option schemes are both popular and widely criticised.  Participants can be 
rewarded for market rises on which they had no influence, they bear no risk 
(unprofitable options are simply not exercised) and seldom retain shares they exercise.  
Requirements for the share price to exceed a benchmark and for executives to retain a 
minimum shareholding partly address these points. 
 
4.2. Performance share plans 
In Hermes’ view, schemes based on the grant of shares are profitable to many share 
option schemes.  It is difficult to specify an appropriate level of grant (eg 50% or 
100% of base salary) because companies give different weights to base salary and 
performance pay.  Remuneration committees should be mindful that, unlike options, 
the full value of the shares (less taxes) will be received by the participants if the 
performance criteria are met.  The over-riding principle, that grants should not be 
excessive, should be observed.  Performance should be measured on a total 
shareholder return basis against a suitable peer group, either a public index or a 
specially constructed one. 
 
 
 
